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Abstract
Human infants readily interpret others’ actions as goal-directed and their understanding of previous goals shapes their
expectations about an agent’s future goal-directed behavior in a changed situation. According to a recent proposal (Luo &
Baillargeon, 2005), infants’ goal-attributions are not sufficient to support such expectations if the situational change involves
broadening the set of choice-options available to the agent, and the agent’s preferences among this broadened set are not known.
The present study falsifies this claim by showing that 9-month-olds expect the agent to continue acting towards the previous goal
even if additional choice-options become available for which there is no preference-related evidence. We conclude that infants do
not need to know about the agent’s preferences in order to form expectations about its goal-directed actions. Implications for the
role of action persistency and action selectivity are discussed.
Introduction
Interpreting others’ actions as goal-directed events is one
of the most extensively studied infant social-cognitive
abilities. It plays a vital and indispensable role in social
learning (Baldwin & Baird, 2001; Csibra & Gergely,
2007), it is evident in infants from at least the end of their
first half-year of life (Csibra, 2008; Woodward, 1998),
and is an ability most likely shared with other species
(Rochat, Serra, Fadiga & Gallese, 2008; Wood, Glynn,
Phillips & Hauser, 2007).
Much of what is currently known about how human
infants interpret observed action as goal-directed
comes from experimental research in which infants
repeatedly witness a goal-directed action, and later
their reactions to similar actions, performed under
modified environmental circumstances, are assessed
(Gergely, Ndasdy, Csibra & Br, 1995; Woodward,
1998). In a particularly influential paradigm (Wood-
ward, 1998), infants are first shown an agent repeatedly
acting on, or towards, one of two available objects.
Next, after the location of the two objects is reversed,
infants look longer if the agent now acts on the pre-
viously un-chosen object. According to the standard
interpretation, results such as these (henceforth called
the ‘Woodward-effect’) are evidence for infants’
encoding of the goals of various actions, including
grasping (Woodward, 1998), pointing and poking (Br
& Leslie, 2007; Woodward & Guajardo, 2002), gazing
(Johnson, Ok & Luo, 2007), approaching (Luo & Ba-
illargeon, 2005; Schlottmann & Ray, 2010; Shimizu &
Johnson, 2004), lifting (Br & Leslie, 2007) or moving
something (Kirly, Jovanovic, Prinz, Aschersleben &
Gergely, 2003). Underlying this paradigm is the
assumption that infants’ encoding of the goal of
actions repeatedly witnessed during habituation or
familiarization can guide representations of goals and
actions in a different context.
Using the same paradigm, a number of recent studies
have shown that infants do not show the Woodward-ef-
fect if the goal-object was the only potential object
available to the agent during familiarization, and if there
is now another potential goal-object present. The lack of
a Woodward-effect in single-target versions of the para-
digm was first reported by Luo and Baillargeon (2005) in
5.5-month-olds familiarized with a self-propelled box
approaching a solitary object. Subsequently, similar
patterns of results have been reported for infants from
3.5 to 12.5 months, the stimuli involving human as well
as non-human agents, and the target-object acted upon
being initially either the only one present in the scene, or
the only one perceptually accessible to the agent (Luo,
2011; Luo & Baillargeon, 2007; Luo & Johnson, 2009;
Br, Verschoor & Coenen, 2011).
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These results from one-object versions of the paradigm
are puzzling.After all, single-target actions are interpreted
by infants as goal-directed in other paradigms (e.g.
Gergely et al., 1995; Csibra, 2008; Southgate & Csibra,
2009). Furthermore, actions directed at a single target, like
simple pursuit or approach, seem like paradigmatic
examples of goal-directedness, and influence adults’
interpretations of even the most basic stimuli (Opfer 2002;
Tremoulet & Feldman, 2006). Last but not least, the lack
of a Woodward-effect in one-object versions of the para-
digm seems incompatible with the intuition that persistent
acting on an object conveys sufficient information to
conclude that the object is the goal of the action (Luo &
Baillargeon, 2005; Luo & Beck, 2010). Indeed, persistence
was thought to be an important cue togoal-directed action
(Premack & Premack, 1994; Montgomery & Montgom-
ery, 1999) long before the seminal Woodward studies.1 If
repeated or persistent action on an object is the basis for
infant’s goal-attribution, why should the presence of a
second object matter?
To date, the commonly accepted answer to this ques-
tion is that a goal-attribution made on the basis of an
agent choosing a particular object cannot inform what
that agent might do if it subsequently has different
options (i.e. object-B in addition to object-A) available
(Luo & Baillargeon 2005, 2007; Carey, 2009). Had the
agent had the option of object-B when it chose object-A,
it may not have chosen object-A at all, and so when
subsequently presented with A and B, the agent’s previ-
ous goal of pursuing object-A may change. This expla-
nation is focused on the extent to which a goal attributed
during familiarization will support infants’ expectation
during test trials, when the circumstances of the action
have changed. Importantly, the exact details of this
change of circumstances are different in different ver-
sions of the paradigm because in the one-target version
there is a change in choice-options from familiarization
to test (two objects instead of one) whereas in the ori-
ginal two-object version there is not. Crucially, on this
account it is assumed that infants did attribute a goal to
the agent during familiarization, based on repeated
action on the same object,2 but that this goal-attribution
is insufficient for infants to predict what the agent should
do when another object becomes available.
The implication of this view is that choice, or prefer-
ence considerations, can constrain infant’s goal-attribu-
tion-based reasoning (Luo & Baillargeon, 2007; Luo &
Beck, 2010). If infants lack evidence of agents’ prefer-
ences among available goal-objects, they would have no
grounds for predicting their next action.3 However, this
hypothesis generates a rather puzzling picture which
seems implausible as a general notion of the relationship
between goal- and preference-attributions. First, given
that real-life environments present ever-changing sets of
choice-options for which the infant would frequently
lack up-to-date preference-attributions, how could
infants ever benefit from their goal-attributions, and use
these for the purpose of action categorization, action
anticipation and social learning (Csibra & Gergely,
2007)? Furthermore, some implausible predictions follow
from this proposal: understanding that A has the goal of
chasing B should be insufficient for infants to form the
(likely correct) prediction that A will continue to chase B
even when they encounter a new agent (C), as it still
remains to be discovered whether A prefers B to C. In
fact, recent research has demonstrated that if infants are
familiarized to an agent reaching repeatedly for the same
object (A) in the context of other changing objects, they
nevertheless expect the agent to continue reaching for
object-A, even when it is presented in the context of a
new object towards which they have no information
about the agent’s disposition (Feiman, Cushman &
Carey, 2011).
According to the account outlined so far, the cause of
infants’ failures in one-object versions of the Woodward
paradigm lies in how the circumstances of the action
change between familiarization, when the infant attri-
butes the goal, and test, when she generates inferences on
the basis of this attributed goal. However, there is an-
other potentially important difference between the one-
and two-object versions of the paradigm, which has not
been considered. Specifically, the circumstances in which
the action takes place are already different during
familiarization, when infants are assumed to attribute a
goal. In one-object versions of the Woodward paradigm,
infants observe an agent persistently acting on the only
object available, whereas in the classic, two-object ver-
sions, persistent action on one object occurs in the con-
text of another object that is not acted upon. Thus, in
two-object versions, the observed action can be con-
strued both as persistent and selective, whereas in the
one-object version, the action can be construed only as
persistent. Importantly, we do not know which of these
factors – persistence, or selectivity, of action – drives
goal-attribution in the original, two-object Woodward
paradigm, since both are present.4 If selectivity of action
1
Premack and Premack (1994) write ‘whenever an object… persistently
directs its actions towards a single item, a human observer attributes a
goal to the object’.
2
Luo and Baillargeon (2007, p. 491) state: ‘The infants no doubt
attributed to the agent the goal of contacting object-A, since the agent
repeatedly approached this object across trials. However, when object-B
was introduced, the infants had no basis for predicting how the agent
would act: it might again approach object-A, or it might now approach
object-B’ (italics added, see also e.g. Song & Baillargeon, 2007, p. 82).
3
Luo and Baillargeon (2005, p. 605) state: ‘the infants in the control [i.e.
one-target] condition realized at the start of the test trials that they had
no information as to whether the box would prefer the cone or the novel
cylinder, and so could make no prediction about its behavior.’
4
A further, alternative, way in which infants were hypothesized to be
inferring a goal in the Woodward paradigm was based on the famil-
iarity of the action (Woodward, 1999). While familiarity does appear to
modulate goal-attribution, the findings of Luo and Baillargeon (2005)
confirm that it is not familiarity itself that is the crucial cue for goal-
attribution on the Woodward paradigm (see also Br & Leslie, 2007;
Kirly et al., 2003).
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is an important cue for goal-attribution, then its absence
in the one-object version could prevent infants from
attributing a goal altogether. And, if infants failed to
encode the action as goal-directed then this could
account for why they do not demonstrate any expecta-
tion of continued action on that object during test trials.
One indication that repeated action on the same object,
in the absence of other cues to goal-directedness, is
insufficient for goal-attribution may come from another
well-known paradigm for assessing infants’ attribution of
goals. In the so-called efficiency paradigm (Gergely et al.,
1995), infants observe an agent (either human or non-
human) repeatedly, and efficiently, pursuing a single
target. However, despite repeated action on the same
object, if the agent’s action was not efficiently related to
the outcome (e.g. it made a movement that was unnec-
essarily indirect with respect to the target), then infants
did not form an expectation about the agent’s sub-
sequent actions towards this outcome (e.g. Gergely et al.,
1995; Csibra, 2008; Kamewari, Kato, Kanda, Ishiguro &
Hiraki, 2005; Southgate & Csibra, 2009).
Summing up, there are two potentially important ways
in which one- and two-object versions of the Woodward
paradigm differ (different contexts of action in famil-
iarization vs. different changes in action contexts
between familiarization and test) and consequently two
distinct possible reasons for the lack of a Woodward-
effect in one-object versions of the task (lack of action
selectivity during familiarization vs. lack of up-to-date
preference information at test). These two differences are
inevitably confounded in the studies that compare one-
and two-object versions of the task (Luo & Baillargeon,
2005, 2007; Luo & Johnson, 2009). The aim of the cur-
rent study was to elucidate which of these two differences
is responsible for the lack of a Woodward-effect on one-
object versions. To this end, we reasoned that, if the lack
of selective action during familiarization did indeed
preclude infants from attributing a goal (even when there
is repeated action on the same object), then providing
infants with an alternative cue to goal-attribution during
familiarization should reinstate the Woodward-effect,
even in the absence of information about the agent’s
disposition towards the newly introduced object at test.
On the other hand, if infants did attribute a goal during
familiarization based on repeated action on the same
object, but failed to evidence the Woodward-effect due to
a lack of up-to-date preference information at test (Luo
& Baillargeon, 2007), no additional cues to goal-direct-
edness present during familiarization should lead to a
Woodward-effect because infants would still lack up-to-
date preference information. As previously mentioned,
one cue to goal-directedness that infants are known to be
able to exploit is whether an action is efficiently related to
an outcome, where efficiency is judged with respect to
situational constraints (Gergely & Csibra, 2003). Cru-
cially, a direct path to an object, such as that depicted in
the Woodward paradigm, typically does not include
information about any situational constraints that would
necessitate the action pathway taken, and so may not
permit infants to make a goal-attribution based on effi-
ciency of action. Thus, in the current study, we presented
9-month-old infants with a one-object Woodward task
where, in addition to observing repeated action on the
same object, we manipulated whether the observed
action was efficient with respect to the outcome.
Experiment 1
Infants were assigned to either an Experimental group or
to a Control group. Infants in the Experimental group
saw an agent repeatedly approach a single goal-object in
an efficient manner (detouring around an obstacle which
blocked direct access). We predicted that the presence of
efficient action would lead infants to encode the target-
object as involved in the goal of the agent’s action, and
that this goal-attribution would transcend the addition
of another potential goal-object at test, leading infants in
this group to exhibit the typical Woodward-effect, i.e.
look longer on test trials in which the agent changes its
goal (New Goal trials) than on those in which it con-
tinues to approach the previously chosen object in its
new location (New Path trials). Infants in the No-wall
Control group saw an event in which the agent took the
same pathway as in the Experimental group but this time
it was not necessitated by the presence of any obstacle in
the scene, such that the action could not be construed as
efficiently related to the outcome (e.g. Gergely et al.,
1995; Csibra, 2008; Kamewari et al., 2005; Phillips &
Wellman, 2005; Southgate & Csibra, 2009). This condi-
tion mirrors the one-object version of Luo and Baillar-
geon (2005) as it depicts repeated action on the same
object, but no additional cues to goal-directedness. Thus
we expected that infants in the No-wall Control group
would not exhibit a Woodward-effect at test.
Method
Participants
Thirty-two 9-month-old infants (16 male; mean age:
9.1 months; range: 8.3–9.8 months) participated in
Experiment 1. An additional 19 infants were excluded
because of not finishing the procedure (4), fussiness (7),
parental interference (2), looking times to test movies
shorter than 2 s (2), experimenter error (3) and a dif-
ference in looking at the two test movies that was more
than 2.5 SDs away from the group mean (1). Sixteen
infants were assigned to each of the two conditions:
Experimental (mean age = 9.1 months), and No-wall
control (mean age = 9.1 months).
Materials
The stimuli were colorful 3D animations generated with
Blender software (Figure 1). They depicted a red block
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(henceforth the agent) entering the scene centrally from
the top of the display and approaching and stopping next
to a target-object located in the foreground. For the
experimental group, there was always a horizontal brick-
wall standing in the middle of the screen and the agent
detoured around the wall on its way to the target. The
wall had three sizes across familiarization trials (in fixed
order: medium, wide, narrow, medium) and the agent’s
detour path varied accordingly.5 In each case, the dura-
tion of movement was always 4 s. On each familiariza-
tion trial, the same solitary target (blue-striped cylinder
or dotted tube) stood at the same location (left or right
side of the screen), and the agent took the same pathway,
detouring around the side of the barrier closest to which
the target-object sat. In test trials, the familiar target now
stood on the opposite side of the screen, its former
location now occupied by a new target-object. The wall
during test was medium-sized and the agent approached
either the new target (New Goal trial) or the familiar
target (New Path trial). The scene was symmetrical so the
agent’s left-side path was a mirror-image of the right-side
path. Stimuli for the No-wall Control group were iden-
tical, but no wall was present. A single orientation trial
was administered between familiarization and test which
comprised the first frame of the test trial movies, and
served to familiarize infants to the presence of two ob-
jects.
Procedure
Infants sat on their parents’ lap in a dimmed room
approximately 100 cm away from a 102 · 57.5 cm plas-
ma screen on which the stimuli were presented. Each trial
was preceded by an unrelated attention-getting anima-
tion of rotating shapes. Each familiarization and test trial
started with the agent approaching a target-object (ap-
proach phase, 4 s) and stopping next to it until the end of
the trial (outcome phase). The four familiarization trials
ended when the child looked away from the screen for
more than 2 consecutive seconds after looking at the
screen for 2 cumulative seconds during the outcome
phase, or after 30 s of the outcome phase. The same
criterion was used to terminate the orientation trial. The
two test trials ended when the infant looked away for
more than 2 consecutive seconds during the outcome
phase. Two infants (one from each group) who watched
the outcome for less than 2 seconds on a test trial were
replaced.
Test trial order (New Goal first vs. New Path first),
initial target-identity (cylinder vs. tube) and initial target-
location (left vs. right) were counterbalanced in each
group in a 2 · 2 · 2 design. Preliminary analyses found
no main effects or interactions involving these factors, so
they were not included in subsequent analyses.
Data analysis
Looking times were coded off-line by two coders: the
first author and a research assistant blind to the design
and hypothesis. Looking times on test trials from one-
third of the babies were coded by both coders and cor-
related at r = .98, with the mean absolute difference
between the codings = 550 ms. The analysis was carried
out on the coding of the first author.
Results and discussion
The mean looking times during each trial for each con-
dition are shown in Figure 2 and Table 1. As with other
studies using the same paradigm (e.g. Woodward, 1998),
to correct for positive skew, we applied a logarithmic
transformation on the looking times before parametric
analyses. Infants were very attentive during the ap-
proach-phase of the familiarization trials: only on six
trials (5%) from six different participants was the agent’s
Figure 1 Examples of stimuli. The snapshots show static dis-
plays during which infants’ looking times were recorded.
White lines indicate approach-paths of the agent and were not
visible to the participants.
5
Variability of the action path during familiarization was included as
previous studies have shown that infants require such additional cues to
agency when events include non-human agents (e.g. Br & Leslie, 2007;
Csibra, 2008).
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approach not attended to 100% of the time. Data from
the outcome phases of the familiarization trials were
entered into a 4 (Trial: 1, 2, 3, 4) · 2 (Group: experi-
mental, control) ANOVA which revealed no effect of
Group [F(1, 29) = 2.13, p = .155] nor interaction [F(3,
87) = .438, p = .73]. It did, however, reveal a main effect
of Trial [F(3, 87) = 5.14, p < .003] due to a significant
linear trend decreasing across familiarization trials [F(1,
29) = 9.37, p < .005]. Similarly, the two groups did not
differ in their looking times to the Orientation trial
[t(30) = .46, p = .65]. Altogether these analyses show
that both groups received equivalent exposure to famil-
iarization and orientation events before watching test
trials.
No infant looked away from the screen during the
agent’s approach on test trials. Log-transformed looking
times towards the outcome of test trials were first ana-
lyzed using a 2 · 2 ANOVA with Group (experimental,
control) as a between-subjects factor and Test event
(New Goal, New Path) as a within-subjects factor. This
analysis revealed a significant main effect of Group [F(1,
30) = 5.5, p = .026] and, crucially, a significant interac-
tion between Group and Test event [F(1, 30) = 5.75,
p = .023], but no main effect of Test event [F(1,
30) = .72, p = .4]. Planned comparisons revealed that the
experimental group looked significantly longer during
the New Goal than during the New Path trials [F(1,
30) = 5.26, p = .029] whereas the No-wall Control group
did not [F(1, 30) = 1.2, p = .28]. Non-parametric tests
further support this conclusion: in the experimental
group 12 out of 16 infants looked longer during New
Goal trials [Z = 2.12, p = .034, Wilcoxon two-tailed],
while in the No-wall Control group, only seven out of 16
infants showed this pattern [Z = .98, p = .35, Wilcoxon
two-tailed].
In order to make sure that these different looking–time
patterns during test trials were not caused by some
uncontrolled differences in earlier attention to the new
goal-object itself, cumulative lengths of fixations (in
seconds) during the Orientation trial were coded sepa-
rately for the new object [Experimental group: M = 6.1,
SD = 3.27; No-wall Control: M = 5.53, SD = 3.76] and
for the familiar object [Experimental group: M = 5.04,
SD = 3.76; No-wall Control: M = 4.74, SD = 2.63].
They were log-transformed and entered into a 2 (Group:
experimental, control) · 2 (Target: familiar, new) ANOVA,
which found no significant effects or interactions,
thereby ruling out this low-level explanation of looking
patterns in test trials.
Consistent with our prediction, infants in the Experi-
mental group did exhibit the Woodward-effect on a one-
object version of the paradigm, when provided with
additional cues to goal-attribution during familiariza-
tion. Specifically, the Experimental group, but not the
No-wall Control group looked significantly longer on
new goal than old goal test trials, suggesting that infants
in the Experimental group attributed to the agent the
goal of approaching the target-object during familiar-
ization, and expected it to continue to pursue the same
goal even when presented in the context of a new
potential target. Crucially, the lack of information about
the agent’s preferences among the objects at test did not
prevent infants from using this previously attributed goal
to generate predictions in a new context. These results
strongly suggest that the reason why infants failed to
exhibit the Woodward-effect on previous one-object
versions of the paradigm (e.g. Luo & Baillargeon, 2005,
2007) and in our No-wall Control condition is not
because the presence of a new object of unknown pref-
erence status renders previous goal-attributions irrele-
vant, but because the lack of cues to goal-attribution
during familiarization prevented infants from attributing
a goal in the first place.
One objection to our explanation for the enduring
goal-attributions of infants in our Experimental group is
that the obstacle itself may have been interpreted by in-
fants as a potential target, and, since the agent always
approached the object (and detoured past the obstacle),
perhaps this action was interpreted as selective by in-
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Figure 2 Mean looking times to New Goal and New Path
test events across the three groups (Experiments 1 and 2). Error
bars indicate standard errors of means. Asterisk indicates
significant within-group difference.
Table 1 Mean looking times (and standard deviations) to each trial across the three groups (Experiments 1 and 2)
Familiarization Test
1 2 3 4 Orientation New Goal New Path
Experiment 1
Experimental 13.65 (7.88) 9.93 (7.05) 12.03 (7.41) 8.97 (8.04) 13.39 (7.59) 10.76 (6.6) 7.38 (4.91)
No-wall Control 10.70 (7.24) 7.82 (5.96) 7.35 (5.40) 6.53 (5.91) 11.70 (5.95) 5.1 (2.51) 5.99 (2.92)
Experiment 2
Short-wall Control 11.6 (7.19) 10.39 (8.53) 10.01 (7.37) 6.66 (7.32) 10.98 (4.45) 7.55 (4.49) 9.72 (7.58)
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fants. If this was the case, and selectivity of action is a cue
to goal-attribution, it may be that it is this cue, rather
than the efficiency of action, that led infants to attribute
a goal to the agent. Note that even if this was the case,
the results would still be inconsistent with the explana-
tion that a lack of preference information can constrain
goal-attribution. Even if the infant interpreted the agent
as preferring the target to the obstacle, this still does not
tell the infant whether the agent would prefer the target
over the new object presented alongside the target at test.
Experiment 2 was designed to test whether the presence
of the wall in the movies watched by the Experimental
group in Experiment 1 facilitated performance because it
helped infants encode actions as efficient and goal-di-
rected or because it helped them encode the actions as
selective and hence goal-directed.
Experiment 2
If the presence of an obstacle around which the agent
detours in Experiment 1 provided infants with evidence
of selectivity of action and it was this, rather than evi-
dence of efficiency of action, that led them to generate a
goal-attribution, the presence of any obstacle, even if it
was not accompanied by efficient action, should lead
infants to generate the same expectation of continued
action on the same object at test. Thus, in Experiment 2,
we presented a new group of infants with events in which,
although a barrier was present, the action observed by
infants was not necessitated by this barrier. Specifically,
in Experiment 2, although the agent detoured around the
wall, the extent of the detour was unnecessary consid-
ering the width of the wall (Figure 1) and so could not be
interpreted as efficient. If infants in Experiment 1
attributed a goal to the agent based on selectivity of
action (i.e. acting on one object rather than another)
during familiarization rather than efficiency of action, we
should expect that they will do the same in Experiment 2,
and subsequently expect the agent to continue pursuing
the previously approached object at test. However, if it
was the efficiency of the observed action in Experiment 1
that led infants to generate a goal-attribution and an
expectation that the agent would continue to approach
the same goal even in the presence of a new object, then
the inability to efficiently relate the action to the outcome
in Experiment 2 should prevent infants from attributing
a goal during familiarization and consequently from
forming any particular expectation about the agent’s
actions at test.
Method
Participants
Sixteen 9-month-old infants (8 female, mean age:
9 months, range: 8.3–9.8 months) were assigned to a new
Short-wall Control group. An additional six babies were
tested but excluded either because they had looking times
to test movies that were shorter than 2 s (5) or because of
equipment failure (1).
Materials and procedure
The procedure for the Short-wall Control group was
identical to that of the Experimental group in Experi-
ment 1 except for the size and position of the wall fea-
tured in the stimuli (see Figure 1). Infants in Experiment
2 saw the exact same movement pathways (width and
direction) as infants in the Experimental group of
Experiment 1, the only difference between these two
conditions being that the wall depicted in the Short-wall
Control group was always short and did not require the
detour that the agent took.
Data analysis
Looking times on all trials were coded off-line by the first
author. Looking times on test trials from half of the
babies were also coded off-line by a research assistant
blind to the design and hypothesis. The two codings
correlated at r = .99, with the mean absolute differ-
ence = 170 ms. Again, the coding of the first author was
used for subsequent analysis.
Results and discussion
The mean looking times from Experiment 2 are pre-
sented in Table 1. As in Experiment 1, raw looking times
were log-transformed prior to parametric analyses in
order to approximate a normal distribution. No signifi-
cant main effects or interactions involving test trial order,
initial target-identity, or initial target-location were
found.
As in Experiment 1 looking times to the familiariza-
tion events showed a significant linear decrease across
familiarization [F(1, 15) = 5.74, p < .03], and this pat-
tern did not differ from that observed in each group of
Experiment 1 [highest F(1, 44) = .93, p = .33]. Similarly,
the Short-wall group’s attention to the orientation trial
was not different from infants in Experiment 1 [highest
t(30) = .78, p = .44]. As in Experiment 1, neither of the
target-objects in orientation was attended to longer than
the other [t(15) = 1.29, p = .22].
As in Experiment 1, all approach phases of test trials
were attended to 100% of the time. A paired-samples
t-test revealed that, unlike the Experimental group of
Experiment 1, the Short-wall group of Experiment 2 did
not look longer at the New-Goal test event (in fact only
eight of 16 babies showed such looking pattern). Instead,
infants in the Short-wall group looked equally at both
test events [t(15) = .69, p = .49]. Combining the results
from the two experiments, a 3 (Group: Experimental,
No-wall and Short-wall) · 2 (Test Event: New Goal vs.
Old Goal) factor ANOVA revealed only significant
simple interactions for contrasts involving the Experi-
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mental and No-wall groups [F(1, 45) = 4.58, p = .038],
as well as the Experimental and Short-wall groups [F(1,
45) = 4.13, p = .048], consistent with the conclusion that
the Experimental group indeed responded to test events
differently from each Control group. Specifically, only
the Experimental group looked longer at the New-Goal
than New Path test event. No other significant effects or
interactions were found.
Overall, the results of Experiment 2 suggest that the
wall was not regarded by infants as a potential goal-
object which could enable them to interpret the action
upon the target-object as a selective action. Rather, the
presence of a Woodward-effect in the Experimental
group, and the lack thereof in the Short-wall group
suggest that it was the efficiency of action during
familiarization that enabled goal-attribution, which
endured the addition of a potential new target at test.
General discussion
The fact that infants can structure observed actions in
terms of goals is incontrovertible, and indeed the ability
to do so would be a prerequisite for social learning
(Csibra & Gergely, 2007). What is less clear is how infants
are able to interpret actions as goal-directed, and how
these attributions could support their subsequent social
reasoning. Based on findings that infants do not expect
an agent to continue to pursue a previously chosen goal-
object if that agent subsequently encounters other
potential goals, it was proposed that goal-attributions
are suspended in the absence of knowledge about an
agent’s preferences among currently available goal-
objects (Luo & Baillargeon, 2005, 2007). This hypothesis
implies that goal-attributions could not play a funda-
mental role in predicting an agent’s behavior, since it is
likely that there will often be potential targets appearing
for which the infant might lack up-to-date preference
information. For example, on this view, attributing to
person A the goal of chasing person B would be sus-
pended if these two people were subsequently observed
running through a crowd of people for whom the
observer had no knowledge of the agent’s disposition
towards. However, the data presented here, showing that
9-month-old infants do expect an agent to continue to
pursue a previously chosen object in the presence of new
objects, if the action they had observed was efficiently
related to the outcome, contradicts that view, suggesting
instead that infants’ performance on those tasks reflected
a failure to attribute any goal in the first place. By pro-
viding infants with a known cue to goal-attribution, we
were able to show that infants exhibit the Woodward-
effect despite lacking up-to-date preference or disposi-
tional information concerning other objects (see also
Br et al., 2011; Luo 2011).6
This finding has theoretical implications that deserve
further exploration. Specifically, it suggests that the cue
that infants exploit in order to attribute a goal on the
standard two-object Woodward paradigm is not repeated
action on an object, but rather the selectivity of the action.
If repeated action was sufficient, it should result in the
same expectation of continued action on the previously
chosen object (even in the presence of new potential tar-
gets) that efficiency was able to generate. The assumption
that a repeated reach to a solitary object is sufficient for
goal-attribution has its origins in the suggestion that
persistence is a good cue for goal-attribution (Premack &
Premack, 1994). If an agent demonstrates continued effort
to attain an outcome, a good interpretation is that this
outcome was the goal of her action, and indeed young
children do exploit persistence in order to interpret an
action as goal-directed (Montgomery & Montgomery,
1999). This notion of persistence is assumed to be at the
core of theWoodward paradigm: infants observe an agent
repeatedly acting on or towards the same target-object
and interpret her action as directed towards the goal of
obtaining the object (e.g. Luo & Beck, 2010). Why would
it not also be sufficient for goal-attribution in the one-
target version (Luo & Baillargeon, 2005, 2007)? One
possibility is that the actions presented to infants were not
variable enough to be considered evidence of persistence.
Premack and Premack argue that one caveat to the
importance of persistence for interpreting an action as
goal-directed is that the repeated actsmust not be repeated
perfectly, and indeed imperfect repetition over trials (e.g.
an agent jumping at varying heights each time) has been
shown to crucially affect infants’ and young children’s
ability to attribute goals in other studies (e.g. Br &
Leslie, 2007; Csibra, 2008; Montgomery & Montgomery,
1999). However, in the Woodward paradigm, infants are
typically familiarized to an identical action on each trial
and perhaps this lack of variation may have been a threat
to goal-attribution. Further evidence that infants do not
attribute a goal to a repetitive direct reach towards a single
target is provided by Br et al. (2011).
While the current study provides another demonstra-
tion that efficiency of action is an important cue enabling
infants to make sense of novel or ambiguous actions7
6
Ad hoc modifications are of course possible which would allow one to
maintain that groups failing one-target versions of Woodward’s goal-
attribution task nevertheless attribute goals to one-target actions.
Additional behavioral cues may somehow strengthen encoding of the
goal which is attributed even in their absence (Luo, 2011). Or they may
facilitate encoding of the goal in more specific terms (e.g. the goal is to
approach this object), while in their absence the goal may be still
encoded, but more broadly (e.g. the goal is to approach an object). We
thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing out this logical possibility.
7
To our knowledge the present study is also the first to document that
infants of this age require so little exposure to a completely novel action
in order to evaluate its efficiency: just four 4-seconds-long approach-
actions by an unfamiliar inanimate agent provided enough relevant
information for the 9-month-olds in the Experimental group (Experi-
ment 1). Moreover, this study also shows that actions watched by this
group must have been encoded as efficiently related to the goal of
approaching a particular goal-object.
720 Mikolaj Hernik and Victoria Southgate
 2012 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
(Brandone & Wellman, 2009; Csibra, Br, Kos &
Gergely, 2003; Luo, 2010; Southgate & Csibra, 2009), it
also highlights a new cue that has not previously been
considered to be important in goal-attribution; that of
selective action. In addition to being a reliable cue
towards the goal, action’s selectivity (i.e. the fact that
that action is directed at one object relative to another)
could enable infants to interpret that action as reflecting
an agent’s preference or choice. In this sense, preference
information (conveyed by selective actions) may indeed
have an impact on processing of goals. But the rela-
tionship between goals and preferences implied by our
study is quite different from that suggested by Luo and
Baillargeon (2005, 2007). Rather than constraining or
modulating inferences based on previously attributed
goals, our data imply that preference-related information
is more likely to be a factor in generating goal-attribu-
tion. Taken together with previous research (Br &
Leslie, 2007; Kirly et al., 2003; Luo & Baillargeon,
2005), our data point to multiple cues which young
infants can flexibly make use of in order to interpret an
action as goal-directed. Whereas both efficiency and
selective action may serve as cues to goal-attribution, it is
also important to note that they are not in themselves
sufficient cues for younger infants in the absence of
variability of action (Br & Leslie, 2007; Csibra, 2008).
How these cues interact, and whether some serve goal-
attribution better than others, is an open question. For
example, would an inefficient action performed selec-
tively on a target result in goal-attribution? A recent
study presented subjects with an actor who changed his
mind during a reach towards one object and reached
towards the other object (Carter, Hodgins & Rakison,
2011; cf. Verschoor & Br, 2011). While this kind of
action would lack efficiency information (since the ob-
served action detoured away from the object that was
ultimately the goal), subjects may nevertheless have been
able to use the selectivity of action in order to interpret
the action as goal-directed.
While the Woodward paradigm is one of the most
commonly used tools for investigating the psychological
constructs that infants operate with, it has been taken for
granted that it reflects goal-attribution based on detec-
tion of persistence in action (e.g. Luo & Beck, 2010). The
current study suggests that selectivity may be the more
important cue towards the goal in this paradigm. It also
shows that infants do not need to know about the agent’s
current preferences in order to benefit from inferences
based on the previously attributed goal. Preferences ex-
pressed in selective action are more likely to generate,
rather than constrain, infants’ goal-attribution.
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